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Dissolution Considerations for Co-Founders of Startups

The Importance of Mandatory Dissolution Provisions in Agreements Among Co-Owners

When co-founders of a startup are forming their entity and putting their founder agreements together, one issue that is often overlooked concerns the resolution of deadlocks or dissolving the business if the co-founders are unable to co-exist. By the time many founders figure out the importance of this issue, the honeymoon phase of their relationship with their co-founder(s) has worn off and the ability to extract themselves from the business (or their co-founder(s)) has become significantly more difficult and expensive.

While buy-sell provisions are standard in written agreements among co-founders to address deadlocks or separation, in practice they are often of limited value and rarely utilized. The valuation methodologies in buy-sell provisions are frequently dated and they sometimes lack the mechanical detail necessary for a founder to trigger without simply instigating interpretive disputes with other co-founders.

For example, we recently saw a buy-sell provision in a contentious situation where it was not clear whether events triggering the buy-sell had occurred, and therefore subject to competing interpretations between the co-founders.

Nor should founders rely on judicial dissolution statutes under state corporate, partnership or limited liability company acts as a practical avenue to dissolve their business relationship. Many of these judicial dissolution statutes require costly litigation to be utilized and even then, there is often no section of the statute requiring a judge to formally dissolve the business.

However, unlike an impractical buy-sell provision or an arcane judicial dissolution statute, a mandatory dissolution agreement among co-founders is intended to provide the principal co-founders with a right to dissolve the business in a relatively cost-effective and pre-agreed upon manner from the outset (and likely when the co-founders are thinking more objectively than is often the case when their relationship may have soured).

Think of this like a pre-nuptial agreement among business partners. This dissolution arrangement should be negotiated and written at the beginning of the relationship (not the end) and should be included in the body of the operating or partnership agreement (for LLCs and partnerships) or the shareholders agreement (for corporations). We sometimes advise that a separate “Dissolution Agreement” be attached as an exhibit to the shareholders or operating/partnership agreement.

Key Provisions for Dissolution Considerations Agreements

Appointment of a Liquidating Trustee* and Authority to Wind Up. The liquidating trustee is responsible for carrying out the winding up of the business. Typically, one co-founder is appointed the liquidating trustee, but there can be more than one and the co-founders can agree to take on shared responsibilities.

Regardless, the principal co-founders should all agree on the specific wind-down procedures, and when and how they are to occur. *As a quick note, reference here to a “liquidating trustee” is a term of art – I am simply referring to the person or persons authorized to take wind-up actions required for a dissolution (in practice that person might be a general partner, manager, CEO, etc.).

Accounting; Financial Statements; Taxes. The co-founders should agree on who the accountant will be to prepare the final books and taxes for the business, and it is advisable to agree that they will be prepared and filed in accordance with the historical custom of the business. This helps eliminate the ability for co-founders to argue over accounting and tax items where prior custom has existed.

There should be a deadline date by which the accountant for the business is required to make final tax filings in order to prohibit any one co-founder from unnecessary procrastination or otherwise attempting to prevent or delay the final completion of financial and tax matters.

Capital Contributions. The co-owners should include a provision that requires the payment of certain additional capital contributions in connection with various creditor obligations and expenses and other payments during the winding up process, and the process for calling and making those contributions.

Division of Company Assets. The dissolution agreement should establish how distributions of cash and other business property will be handled during the winding up period and upon final liquidation. Typically, distributions of cash would be handled in accordance with the applicable distribution provisions contained in the operative agreements among co-founders (such as an operating agreement).

Consideration should be given to whether distributions should be limited (or prohibited) during the dissolution period while vendors or creditors are owed money. Depending on the situation, the division of other business property may be in a manner that differs from percentage ownership or historical distributions. If so, this should be spelled out.

Non-Disparagement and Restrictive Covenants. A mutual non-disparagement clause is advisable, but non-compete and non-solicit agreements are generally not included to allow each co-founder to continue in the business for his, her or its own account following (but not before) the termination of the company or partnership.

Costs and Expenses of Winding Up. The agreement should specify how all costs and expenses arising out of the wind-up process will be split among the co-founders, and deadlines for their payment should be established. These costs would typically be split based on the ownership percentages of the co-founders and/or however historically split among them pre-dissolution.

Indemnification. Each co-founder should be obligated to indemnify and hold harmless the other co-founders for all losses incurred because of the indemnifying co-founder’s breach or failure to perform any of its duties and obligations under the dissolution agreement.

Dispute Resolution. As is prudent with any other contract, the parties should specify a forum for dispute resolution, whether a court venue, arbitration, or the assignment of disputes to a third party, such as an independent accounting arbitrator for any disputes over the final preparation of the financial statements or tax returns. We also normally advise on the inclusion of an attorneys’ fees recovery provision by a prevailing party which is helpful to hold each co-founder’s feet to the fire in ensuring that it does what it is obligated to do under the dissolution agreement.

Conclusion

A mandatory dissolution agreement can provide co-founders of a closely held business with a relatively streamlined, cost-effective and balanced manner of exiting when the business is not working out or the co-founders are not getting along. While the parties are always free to agree to a different deal outside of the dissolution agreement, when no such deal can be struck, the dissolution agreement will provide a baseline from which the founders can separate equitably and efficiently.

Linden Law Partners has extensive experience advising companies and business owners on all aspects of dissolution considerations and the agreements around them. Contact us here for help.

Overview of Equity Incentive Compensation for Startups and Early Stage Companies

Hiring and keeping talented employees is a challenge for many businesses, but in particular for startups and early-stage companies that are more limited in the amount of cash flow they can commit to competitive salaries. One way to bridge this gap is with equity incentive compensation. Broadly speaking, equity incentive compensation refers to the grant by a company to its key employees and service providers of an ownership stake.

For startups positioned to realize significant potential growth in the value of their companies, this type of compensation can be especially appealing to employees and service providers who see the potential of “getting in on the ground floor”. But more than just luring top talent, equity incentive compensation can help any company achieve the following:

1. More strongly align the interests of, and incentivize high-level performance from, key employees or service providers;

2. Build employee loyalty and develop a more authentic sense of purpose; and

3. Save and redeploy early stage cash that would otherwise have to be spent on salaries or contract labor.

Types of Employee Equity Incentive Plans for Private Companies

Equity incentive compensation can take many forms for private companies, with each presenting a unique set of advantages and disadvantages. While the optimal types and structures for any given company will depend on its particular business circumstances, below is a summary highlighting some of the most popular kinds of equity incentives used by many private companies today.

Stock Options. Stock options are a well-known form of equity incentive compensation that can be utilized by corporations. The holder of a stock option has the right to buy stock of the company at a set price, called the “exercise price”, for a certain period of time (typically ten years) beginning when the stock option vests.

The exercise price usually is equal to the fair market value of the stock at the time the stock option is granted. Stock options almost always vest over time (typically 3-4 years) to help motivate the recipient to continue to be employed with the company longer term. The holder becomes an actual shareholder of the company only when the stock option is exercised and the stock underlying the option is purchased for the exercise price.

Stock options can be attractive to holders if the company expects substantial growth and/or a liquidity event (sale) down the road at an increased value. However, if there is no appreciation in the company’s stock over time, then the option provides the holder with no financial benefit. The holder of a stock option must also have the cash necessary to pay the exercise price to convert the options to actual shares of stock.

As a practical matter, stock options of a private company are almost always converted only at the time of some liquidity event, such as a sale of the company or an IPO, and then the exercise is “cashless” (meaning the exercise price is taken off the top of the proceeds the option holder would otherwise realize had he or she actually paid the cash exercise price, converted the options to shares, and then concurrently sold them at a profit as part of the liquidity event).

Restricted Stock. Restricted stock is an actual grant of shares of stock, but for a period of time (a “restricted period”) the shares (1) can typically be repurchased by the company for a set price, (2) are subject to forfeiture by the holder without payment upon the occurrence of certain events, such as when the holder’s services to the company terminate prior to vesting in full, and (3) are subject to restrictions on transfer or resale.

Because the holder will become a shareholder on the grant date, he or she will normally have the right to vote and receive dividends. Restricted stock can incentivize holders since they should theoretically become similarly aligned with the company’s other shareholders immediately upon the initial grant.

The holder isn’t required to pay anything (or only a minimal amount) at the time the stock is granted, and depending on the value of the stock at the time of grant, he or she may realize a substantial long-term tax benefit by making an IRS Section 83(b) tax election.

Profits Interests. Profits interests are the most common form of equity compensation used today by partnerships and limited liability companies. Profits interests are awarded to key employees and service providers in exchange for his or her contribution of services to the company (in lieu of being required to make a cash or other tangible capital investment as would be the case for a traditional equity investor).

A profits interest is technically an ownership interest that gives the holder the right to a share of future profits and appreciation of the company, but the holder is not entitled to participate in the capital and accumulated profits or value of the company as of the initial grant date.

For example, if the “hurdle” or “threshold” value of the profits interest holder’s participation was $3 million, it means the holder’s profits interest only begins to share in the company’s distributions or sale proceeds after the initial $3 million of value has been paid to its founders and/or cash equity investors. Please see our profits interest blog for additional information and key considerations around granting profits interests specifically.

Other. Other equity-based forms of incentive compensation include restricted stock units, stock appreciation rights, phantom stock, and long-term cash incentive plans.

Conclusion

A properly structured equity incentive compensation plan can help innovative companies stand out from their competitors when it comes to hiring and retaining key talent. However, various legal and business considerations, including important tax considerations, are critical when determining the best plan and structure for a particular company. Linden Law Partners has many years of experience counseling entrepreneurs and businesses on the intricacies of equity incentive compensation. Contact us here for help.

Timeless and Timely M&A Due Diligence Considerations

Due diligence is an important and expected part of any merger or acquisition (M&A) transaction. The due diligence process gives the buyer the opportunity to identify any operational or legal risks that may exist with the seller or its business prior to entering into a purchase agreement and closing the transaction.

Further, any specific issues (that do not arise to the level of terminating the transaction) identified during due diligence will typically be accounted for in the purchase agreement through the negotiation of terms such as the purchase price, representations and warranties, closing conditions, and post-closing indemnification obligations of the seller.

Typical Scope of M&A Due Diligence Considerations

The scope of M&A due diligence and a buyer’s exact requests will vary based on the specific transaction. While not exhaustive, summarized below are some of the general areas almost always covered by a buyer’s due diligence requests:

1. Business Organization. A seller will need to provide its corporate records concerning its formation and good standing, governing documents (e.g., articles or certificate of incorporation or organization, bylaws, operating agreement), share ownership, and capitalization.

Other items can include records pertaining to jurisdictions where the seller conducts business or owns or leases real property, and documentation in connection with any equity or debt financings, securities issuances, stock repurchases, or material acquisition or disposition transactions.

2. Accounting/Financial. Requests under this general category will include copies of tax returns for certain periods (typically the prior 2-5 years), financial statements, and documentation pertaining to loan or other debt arrangements. Sellers will also be asked to include any information pertaining to any past or pending tax proceedings or controversies.

Other types of reports or statements requested may include budgets, accounts receivable aging reports, an accounts payable list, and other documentation detailing the income, expenses, and liabilities of the business.

3. Operations, Customers, Business Insurance, Etc. A buyer will want to review a seller’s customer, vendor, and supplier agreements, marketing and sales plans and arrangements, other contracts material to the business, as well as commercial liability and property insurance policies and claims.

Information regarding real and personal property, including inventory (if applicable), of the seller will be required. Information technology and systems and disaster recovery information is also typical. Other requests will vary depending on the seller’s line of business.

4. Human Resources. Buyers will ask for employee, salary, and bonus information, employment agreements, independent contractor information and agreements, collective bargaining and other labor contracts, health, welfare, and safety practices and policies, and OSHA, EEOC, and other employee-related complaints and proceedings.

Also included under this category will be summaries and copies of the Company’s employee benefit plans, including 401(k), medical, dental, disability, and life insurance plans and benefits.

5. Legal and Compliance. This area of due diligence covers all litigation matters, required permits, licenses, and other government and regulatory approvals, intellectual property disclosures and related USPTO filings, environmental compliance, and any other specific legal or regulatory matters applicable to the business.

How COVID-19 May Affect the Due Diligence Process

Due to the uncertainties created by the global pandemic, buyers are likely to approach M&A deals with greater scrutiny than before. As such, buyers may seek detailed information in areas that implicate potential disruptions to the seller’s business, the seller’s financial capability to weather the economic fall-out from COVID-19, and other risks to the target business arising from COVID-19.

Specific due diligence areas that a buyer may want to examine more closely include material contracts with customers, vendors, and suppliers (including the seller’s ability to perform under such contracts as well as termination and force majeure provisions), the seller’s debt obligations and ability to repay, business insurance policy coverages and exclusions, compliance with state and local public health orders,

Compliance with privacy laws that may be implicated (such as if sensitive employee or customer information has been or will be disclosed due to COVID-19), and employee health, safety, and welfare policies and related measures being taken by the seller.

Conclusion

Linden Law Partners has represented sellers and buyers in hundreds of M&A transactions across a variety of industries. We have extensive experience guiding our clients through the ins and outs of the M&A due diligence process. Contact us today for help.

COVID-19 and Material Adverse Change (MAC) Clauses in M&A Deals

What is a MAC Clause?

A ‘material adverse change’ clause (a ‘MAC’ clause or sometimes called a ‘material adverse effect’ or ‘MAE’ clause) is a risk allocation provision which commonly appears in merger, stock or asset purchase agreements as part of an M&A transaction. The two primary functions of a MAC clause are to (1) provide the buyer with a costless cancellation right if during the period that occurs after the definitive acquisition agreement has been signed but before closing there is a material adverse event that negatively impacts the target company, or its business or value, and (2) qualify some or all of the seller’s representations and warranties (‘reps’) made in the definitive agreement.   

What Does a Typical MAC Clause State and How Does it Work?

The typical MAC clause is defined as any development, event, change, condition or state of facts which has had, or would reasonably be expected to have, a material adverse change (or effect) on the business, assets, financial condition or results of operations of the subject party. However, and for the benefit of the seller, most MAC clauses will also specifically exclude effects related to things like (1) general economic, financial, credit or other broad industry or market conditions at large, and (2) political conditions, acts of war or terrorism, natural disasters or acts of God.

In a deal cancellation context, if an event included in the definition of the MAC clause occurred between signing and closing, the buyer has the legal right to terminate the consummation of the transaction without liability to the seller (note that usually even the most well-drafted MAC rep will be highly contested and subject to dispute by the parties as to whether the event constitutes a MAC occurrence or carve-out like “general economic conditions”, etc.).

In a seller representation and warranty context, a MAC event can impose liability on the seller if there is a breach of a seller’s rep around a MAC event. For example, if a seller with unionized employees made a “No MAC” rep, closed the transaction, and after the closing a labor strike occurred based on facts or events in motion pre-closing, the seller would have likely breached the rep (this assumes such an event was not carved out from the MAC definition as a specific exclusion for which the buyer could not claim a breach). Although the deal has closed in this example and therefore cannot be terminated, the seller would have breached the MAC rep, giving rise to a viable indemnification claim by the buyer. This is one of many examples of how a MAC rep might come into play depending on the business or industry of the specific seller.

The Likely Impact on Material Adverse Change (MAC) Clauses Due to COVID-19

Historically, most MAC clauses have not included ‘diseases’ or ‘pandemics’ as specific carveouts from the type of negative events for which buyers can otherwise recover from sellers. However, this is likely to change forever due to the COVID-19 pandemic, just as terrorism carveouts became common following the events of September 11, 2001.

A seller will want to carve out the effects of COVID-19 (or any disease or pandemic) as part of the risk allocation process of an M&A transaction. Buyers will also need to think through and address their own protections as part of MAC clause in the COVID-19 deal world.

Conclusion

The practical effects and considerations of MAC clauses in M&A deals have become even more important and top-of-mind ‘overnight’, if you will, and may be permanent long after the COVID-19 pandemic has subsided. The attorneys at Linden Law Partners are specialists on every legal aspect of M&A transactions and positioned to help clients successfully navigate the post COVID-19 deal landscape. Contact us here for help.

Profits Interests Explained

What is a Profits Interest?

Profits interests are the most well-known and commonly used form of equity compensation used by partnerships and limited liability companies that are taxed as partnerships to incentivize key service providers to remain invested in the success of the company. Profits interests are granted to service providers or key employees in exchange for their contribution of services to the partnership (as opposed to cash or other property).

They are similar to stock options in a corporation context, although profits interests are not ‘options’. For purposes of this article, we will refer to “partnership” as an entity, including LLCs, that are taxed as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.

A profits interest is an equity interest in a partnership that gives the holder the right to a share of future profits and appreciation of the partnership, but the holder is not entitled to participate in the capital and accumulated profits or value of the partnership as of the day of the grant of the profits interest. While a profits interest legally constitutes a form of equity (i.e. the holder is deemed an owner of the partnership and receives annual K-1s), it is not a “capital interest”. 

For example, if a partnership was valued at $1mm on the day of grant of a 5% profits interest to a grantee and later sold for $10mm, the grantee would receive 5% of $9mm ($10mm sale price minus $1mm value on grant date, multiplied by 5% (i.e., $450,000). In other words, unlike a capital interest (based on actual cash or other tangible value contributed to the partnership), a profits interest has only the right to “post-grant” partnership income and gain. 

Key Considerations in Granting Profits Interests

Following are a few key issues that typically need to be addressed in structuring profits interests:

Determination of Profits Interest Distribution Threshold

In order to satisfy federal tax law requirements, the value of the capital interests in the partnership should be determined as of the date the profits interest is granted, and this valuation should be included in the profits interest recipient’s grant agreement.

This amount, sometimes referred to as the “hurdle”, must be paid to the capital interest holders upon a complete liquidation of the partnership’s assets before any proceeds of such liquidation are paid to profits interest holders. This ensures that the value of the profits interest is $0.00 as of the date of grant.

Another way of stating this is a fair market value determination of the partnership must be established at the time of each grant of a profits interest (to do otherwise would mean the partnership could not ensure that the value of a profits interest at the time of its grant is actually $0.00). 

Vesting

Profits interests can be fully vested upon grant or can vest over time. Whether or not to require vesting differs for each partnership and transaction. Profits interests that vest over time are used in order to incentivize the key employee or service provider to remain aligned with the partnership over a longer timeframe. A couple of key differences between the treatment of vested and unvested interests are laid out below:

  • Distributions. Vested profits interests receive distributions as other owners of the partnership receive distributions, subject to the distribution threshold discussed above. With unvested profits interests, a partnership could choose for distributions to be distributed to the other owners such that the holder would not receive any distributions with respect to their unvested profits interests, or for distributions to instead be held in a separate account to be distributed to the profits interest holders once the profits interests vest. 
  • Forfeiture and Repurchase. Unvested profits interests are typically forfeited by the holder upon certain events, such as separation of service, whereas vested profit interests would typically be subject to repurchase by the partnership under those same scenarios. 
  • Allocations. If a partnership contemplates profits interests that vest over time, the partnership or operating agreement will often include a provision that allocations from prior years (when the profits interest percentage was lower) will be re-allocated to the holder of the interest upon full vesting.

Company Repurchase Rights

Profits interests are generally subject to repurchase by the partnership on certain events, most typically on discontinuation of providing employment or services to the partnership by the profits interest holder. A “put” right of the profits interest holder, which is the right to force the partnership to buy the holder’s profits interest on certain events, is rare and would only be included in an individual grant agreement negotiated specifically by the partnership and the applicable recipient.

Other Rights of the Profits Interest Holder

Often, profits interests are designated as a separate class of interests under a partnership or operating agreement. By structuring the profits interests in this manner, different rights can be set with respect to those interests, and it is almost universal that the rights attributable to profits interests are much more limited than the rights attributable to capital interests.

Among other things, profits interests are rarely entitled to vote, to be involved in management, or to have preemptive rights or rights of first refusal, etc. (which rights are typical for capital interests or interests held by founders). 

83(b) Election 

Depending on the circumstances, it may be advisable for the profits interest recipient to make what is known in the startup world as an “83(b) election”. Under Section 83(b) of the IRS Code, a taxpayer that receives property subject to vesting as compensation for services (like a profits interest) may elect to include in gross income the fair market value of the property at the time of the grant, rather than in a later year when the property becomes vested.

An 83(b) election also allows the recipient to be taxed at a capital gains rate and not an ordinary income rate down the line (if more than one year from the grant) when and if the profits interest becomes valuable. To be valid, an 83(b) election must be filed with the IRS within 30 days of the profits interest grant date.    

Example: You are granted 100 profits interest units in a startup (based on a deemed valuation of $0.00 per unit on the grant date). There is a three-year vesting period. The units are worth $500.00 per unit after 3 years and become vested. You didn’t file an 83(b) election. At the time of vesting, you will be deemed to have income of $50,000 (whether or not you have been able to actually monetize the units) and you will be required to pay ordinary income tax on that amount.

Applying a 39.6% ordinary income tax means writing a check to Uncle Sam for $19,800. Had an 83(b) election been made, no tax would be payable at the time of vesting and tax would only be payable at the time you actually monetize the units – such as on a sale of the business and then the tax is at the capital gains rate (say a cap gains rate of 20% x $50,000 = $10,000, or savings of $9,800 for this example). 

The filing or non-filing of an 83(b) election is highly important with tax consequences and is a decision that recipients should determine only after consulting with a qualified attorney or certified public accountant. 

Conclusion

Profits interests can be an effective way for partnerships to align the economic interests of key employees and service providers with those of the partnership. However, the legal considerations associated with profits interests can be complex and need to be thought through carefully by both the issuing partnerships and recipients alike.

At Linden Law Partners, we have represented hundreds of partnerships with formation, capitalization and partnership agreement considerations, including the structuring and implementation of profits interest plans and all their associated agreements. Contact us here today to let us know how we can help you.

Key Considerations for Convertible Debt Financings

What is Convertible Debt? 

Startups and entrepreneurs seek to raise early stage capital in a variety of ways, but one of the most common is through a convertible debt structure utilizing a promissory note that can be converted into equity securities of the issuing company on the occurrence of various events stated in the note. 

In the last few years you may have also heard of alternatives to convertible note financings through similar instruments like a “SAFE” (Simple Agreement for Future Equity) or “KISS” (Keep It Simple Securities). These instruments are very similar to convertible notes in that they contain some of the same conversion features as convertible notes, but lack certain debt features such a maturity date and interest. 

Convertible notes are technically debt and could be called due by the holder on the maturity date or a default event just like any other promissory note. However, the primary purpose of a convertible note is not that it be repaid like a loan, but rather that the note investor, in exchange for making a lower priced but higher risk early-stage debt investment, convert that debt to equity and ultimately realize on the upside of a later liquidity event for the issuing company, such as a sale, recapitalization or IPO.

Benefits of Convertible Debt.  

Permits Seed and Early Stage Companies to Raise Capital Without Measurable Valuation 

It is difficult to determine the “pre-money valuation” of an early stage company that has an idea or technology, but little or no revenues, net asset value or cash flows. A convertible note structure allows both the issuing company and its early stage investors to “defer” the valuation determination to a later date when the company raises more money based on more reliable valuation components down the road,

Such as achievement of a product development milestone, realization of revenues or profitability, a stated offer from a third party to acquire the company or raise additional financing based on a specific and more quantifiable valuation, or an IPO.

At one of those specific points in time, where a reliable valuation exists, the outstanding principal amount of the note plus accrued interest would ‘convert’ into equity of the issuing company.

Investor Avoids Overpaying for its Investment; Rewards Early Stage Investors With Equity at a Discounted Price in a Later Financing Round

The note investor typically avoids “overpaying” for any equity securities it receives upon a conversion, such as could happen if it instead purchased straight equity based on overinflated pre-money valuations that are literally pulled out of thin air – which is not uncommon in VC and other early stage investments.

The expectation is for the investor’s debt investment to convert into equity securities upon a later equity financing (typically a Series A round led by institutional or venture capital investors, but it may also be for common stock), whereby the investor will receive the same type of equity and associated shareholder rights as the later-stage investors, but will pay less for that equity because of the higher risk it took by making its debt investment when the company’s valuation was low or not yet established. 

Founders of Seed and Early Stage Companies Can Raise Capital Without Giving Away Too Much Equity Upfront

With convertible notes, the founders mitigate the risk of “giving away too much ownership” out of the chute on the first investment dollars received from investors when there’s little to no operating history for the company. As noted above, a convertible note is debt, not equity, and therefore the investor has fairly limited rights and protections, and the issuing company has few obligations to the note holders outside of standard debt obligations.

More Straightforward Terms and Documentation

Memorializing the terms of a convertible note financing is typically less cumbersome than a straight equity investment. The operative documents are a convertible note and vanilla ‘note purchase agreement’, whereas an equity financing requires, in addition to a purchase agreement, the negotiation and preparation of a number of agreements covering various shareholder rights (such as voting, registration, and co-sale rights, board rights and protections, etc.).

Key Terms in Convertible Debt Notes.

A convertible note will include terms stating the principal amount, interest rate, and maturity date like any other note. However, the key terms in a convertible note center around its conversion features, which include the conversion triggers and the conversion price as further discussed below.

Qualified Financing (or Other Material Event)

A “qualified financing” is usually one of the triggers for conversion of the holder’s debt (other customary triggers include maturity, a change of control, and an IPO). A qualified financing is an equity financing, such as the sale of Series A Preferred Stock, of a specified total dollar amount that will require the note to convert into the equity securities sold in that financing.

The threshold amount necessary to be a “qualified financing” is normally 1x – 2x the principal amount of the convertible notes outstanding, but it varies by company and transaction.

Determining the proper threshold for a qualified financing ensures that the issuing company has raised a certain amount of capital, and that the financing is bona fide, before the investor must convert and lose its priority position as the holder of a debt instrument (which legally has priority of repayment over payment to equity holders on their investments).

Conversion Price

A convertible note investor would not be rewarded for its early investment risk if it had to convert into equity at the identical price being provided to later investors as part of a qualified financing.

Therefore, the price at which the debt will be converted into equity will usually be discounted to the lower of the price obtained by applying one of the following two mechanisms (and what’s common is to give the investor the benefit of the “lower of” conversion price that results from the calculation between the these two following mechanisms).

1. Conversion Discount. A “conversion discount” is a discount on the price per share of the conversion securities to be received by the note investor upon a qualified financing and is almost always included in a convertible note. A 20% conversion discount is typical, but a range between 15% and 25% is not usual. Using the example of a 20% discount, the note holder would be able to convert into equity of the issuing company at just 80 cents on the dollar to obtain the same amount of equity as it would have were it to invest 100 cents on the dollar at the time of the qualified financing or other conversion event.

2. Valuation Cap.  A valuation cap entitles convertible note investors to equity in the company that is priced at the lower of the “valuation cap” or the pre-money valuation of the subsequent qualified financing. Like the conversion discount, a valuation cap rewards seed and early stage investors for taking additional early risk, and it also helps ensure that their stake in the company following conversion upon an extremely large next equity financing will not be unduly small.

For example, if a convertible note provides for a $2mm valuation cap and in the qualifying financing, Series A preferred shares are purchased by investors on the basis of a $4mm valuation at $1.00 per share, the note would convert into shares of Series A preferred stock as if the price per share was actually based on a $2mm valuation, resulting in an effective price of $0.50 per share for the note investor. With this valuation cap, the note investor would receive double the number of shares of Series A preferred stock than it would have if the note did not provide for a valuation cap.

Founders Be Aware of Unintended “Liquidation Windfall”

One issue that founders must think through closely in convertible note financings with valuation caps or conversion discounts is the possible unintended consequences (a windfall of sorts) of inordinately benefitting the note investors at the expense of the founders and other later round equity investors. This risk relates to the “liquidation preference” tied to the equity securities into which the note will convert. 

In its broadest sense, a “liquidation preference” provides that certain shareholders, such as holders of Series A Preferred Stock, will receive a return on their investment prior to the right of other shareholders, such as holders of Common Stock, to receive any proceeds when a company is liquidated, sold, or goes bankrupt.

For example, a 1x liquidation preference entitles the investor to be paid back 100% of its full investment, and a 1.5x liquidation preference entitles the investor to be paid 150% of its full investment, before any common shareholders are paid anything. Multiples are typically 1–2x the original investment but depending on market conditions, they can be 3x or higher.

If a company completes a Series A round at a $5mm pre-money valuation but the convertible notes previously issued have a $2.5mm valuation cap (and assuming the Series A investors have negotiated a liquidation preference above 1x), then in that instance the note investors would receive a 50% discount on the Series A shares they receive on conversion and, if treated exactly like the Series A shares, would also receive the same liquidation preference. This would likely result in a disproportionately high return for the note investors.

Savvy founders can combat this issue through one of two different approaches. The first option is to issue common stock, and not preferred stock, as the “discounted” conversion shares and issue the balance of the conversion shares as preferred stock.

The note investor would receive preferred shares in the qualified financing such that the liquidation preference matches the actual dollars invested in the note financing pre-conversion, but the remainder of the conversion shares will be common stock, which would not be entitled to a liquidation preference. 

The second option is to include terms in the note that gives the company the right to convert the note into a “shadow series” of preferred stock in the next qualified financing. The shadow series is identical in all respects to the preferred stock issued in the qualified financing, except that the aggregate liquidation preference of the shadow series will equal the principal amount of the note.

Conclusion

Convertible debt can be an effective and convenient financing structure for both startups and their early investors. However, there are key nuances for both sides of the deal that require strategic planning and evaluation in order to avoid unintended adverse consequences for founders and investors alike.

At Linden Law Partners, we have negotiated and advised companies, founders and investors on hundreds of early stage and venture capital investments, including convertible debt, KISS, SAFE and other early stage financing structures. 

Contact us here today to let us know how we can help you.

Attract Investors: 5 Business Boosts

Whether you’re just starting a new business or are preparing to scale your existing company to get to the next level, it’s common to seek out potential Attract Investors to provide the capital your company needs to take flight. Unfortunately, most founders can’t just make an appearance on Shark Tank and get top deep-pocketed investors immersed in bidding wars over funding their companies.

However, there are some practical things you can do to maximize your chances of landing the investment capital your business needs.

5 Ways You Can Help Your Business Attract Investors:

1. Present Clear Numbers

When talking with investors, you need to come prepared with detailed numbers about your business. If you’ve just started a company, you should understand and be prepared to demonstrate exactly how much cash you have and what you’ll need for all expenses on the foreseeable horizon.

If your business is more established, provide potential investors with your financial statements (which you need to make sure are 100% accurate). Most investors are willing to sign a non-disclosure agreement before being able to look under the hood at your company’s finances. 

2. Explain the Solution to a Problem that Your Business Provides

Investors will want to intricately understand what your business does and what it plans to do in the future. Giving them a detailed outline of the solution to a problem that your business can provide will help shed light on the investment opportunity. Investors are more likely to get on board if you can articulate a relatable problem and how your business is going to solve it. 

3. Walk Them Through Exactly How You Will Use the Money

Investors want to feel very comfortable that your business is going to use their money wisely. Come to any investor meeting with written information that shows exactly how you will be utilizing the investment proceeds and why you believe your strategy presents the best path to your company’s growth and a solid return to the investors.

4. Feature Your Team 

Ultimately, investors buy into people they believe can execute — they don’t just buy into ideas or products. Your team is everything. It’s either your company’s biggest asset or its biggest liability. Plus, investors want to meet and get to know not just you, but the other members of your team that they’re effectively buying into.

So be sure to showcase the key individuals that are going to be integral to the execution of you company’s plan and vision. Make sure the team is prepped and well equipped to shine before they’re introduced to potential investors.

5. Be Ready to Negotiate a Deal 

Be ready to negotiate your deal before, during and after your presentations and meetings with investors. Know what your bottom line is and if it’s reasonably attainable as you begin to negotiate, lock it down and make it happen. Nothing is more off-putting to investors than founders looking for a perfect deal or who are indecisive.

You need to be decisive in your business and good investors look for that trait in the founders they’re willing to get behind. The more you’ve planned ahead and have considered the various scenarios under which you will or won’t do a deal will pay serious dividends for you when it’s time to negotiate the particulars of the deal terms. 

At Linden Law Partners we’ve helped hundreds of businesses and investors in preparing for, structuring, negotiating, and closing investment transactions of virtually all types and sizes. Please contact us to discuss how we can help.

Rollover Structures in M&A Transactions

Private equity (PE) investors often require certain founders or sellers to exchange or “rollover” in Transactions a percentage of their equity into the buyer of the business (or into a fund or holding company controlled by the PE investor). A similar rollover structure might involve the sellers being required to “co-invest” with the buyer by directly reinvesting (or rolling) a portion of the cash received by the sellers into a minority percentage of the equity of the target company.  The value of the buyer equity is then driven by the target company’s post-closing performance.

In addition to other equity-based management incentives (such as participation in an employee equity incentive plan), rollover transaction structures are used to better align the post-transaction interests of the PE investor and the sellers (such as where founders or key executives are expected to remain with the target company in some capacity after the transaction closes).

The Buyer also benefits from a rollover structure as it results in a reduction in the required cash outlay to pay the purchase price. A rollover structure can also be favorable to selling parties by providing them with an opportunity to participate in potentially high upside upon an exit of the post-closing company (think “second bite at the apple”), particularly in instances where PE partners have a track record of creating significant post-closing benefits through their capital, contacts, or operational expertise.

Rollover structures can also bridge potential valuation gaps that may exist between sellers and buyers over the target company.

Rollover Structures in M&A Transactions

A rollover structure is different than (but is sometimes combined with) the grant of post-closing stock options, LLC “profits interests” or other traditional employment-based equity in the target. Stock options and profits interests are usually subject to vesting and other company favorable terms (such as being junior in right and payment) that do not apply to the class of equity held by PE investors.

Conversely, a rollover or co-investment structure often gives the rolled equity a minority interest but the same economic rights as equity held by PE investors. 

Among other things, this means that a seller’s rollover contribution will receive the benefit of the same per-share price, equivalent distribution rights and general senior ranking status of the PE investor’s equity in the target (but it also means that the seller’s capital contribution associated with the rollover is equally at-risk as that of the PE investors on a pro rata basis).  Sometimes, the roll over equity is junior to the PE equity, though.

Highlighted below are certain key issues often negotiated by the parties as part of agreements relating to the roll over equity:

  • Amount of the Rollover.  Although 20% is often a targeted number, the specific roll over amount is based on various factors, including the type and amount of other management equity-based incentives being offered to the sellers in the acquisition, the existing equity structure of the target company, the amount of risk the PE investor believes management of the seller should retain in the post-closing company, the PE investor’s financing needs in the acquisition, and tax considerations. In the case of an equity rollover, a Seller will typically seek for the rollover to be made on a tax-free basis, making it important for the Seller to confirm the tax treatment of his or her rollover.
  • Repurchase Rights. The PE acquirer will typically seek the right to repurchase a seller’s rollover equity upon his or her termination of employment or services to the post-closing company for any reason. However, because a seller purchases (versus being granted) the equity in the post-closing company through the rollover structure, sellers will typically seek (and should be successful in doing so) in eliminating these restrictions.
  • Vesting. Certain aggressive PE acquirers may seek to have the rollover equity vest over time, depending on the type and amount of equity being rolled over by the seller (such as with the rollover of target company equity that was subject to vesting at the time of rollover). However, a seller will normally resist these requirements with rollover structures given that the seller has made the equivalent of a capital contribution equal to the value of his or her rollover equity at the closing of the transaction.
  • Transfer Restrictions. Typically, the parties will agree to a right of first refusal in favor of the PE investor on any transfer of seller equity, with limited standard exceptions. In addition, a seller will seek to include a tag along right, while the PE investor will seek to include a drag along right.
  • Management Rights. The parties may need to agree on whether the rolled seller equity will have the same voting rights as that of the PE investors, or whether the seller will have any right to appoint directors or LLC managers. In most transactions, the PE investor will maintain control of the board / management, but these agreements will vary by deal and by PE investor.

Counsel knowledgeable on negotiating and structuring rollover or co-investment terms as part of an M&A transaction is often critical to a successful deal outcome. The attorneys at Linden Law Partners have wide-ranging specialized experience with advising buyers and sellers on the various considerations and implementation of M&A transactions with rollover or co-investment elements. 

Earnouts in M&A Transactions

Earnouts in private merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions provide for a portion of the purchase price to be paid to the Seller contingent upon the target company reaching certain financial targets or performance milestones following the closing.  Earnouts are typically among the most heavily negotiated provisions in a private company acquisition and are highly susceptible to disputes following the closing. In this blog, we highlight some of the key considerations and potential issues in structuring an earnout.

When is an Earnout Used?

Earnouts may be used in the following scenarios:

  • When the Buyer and Seller cannot reach agreement on the valuation.
  • When a target company has high potential for growth but does not have a track record to give the Buyer enough comfort that the growth to justify a higher purchase price will be achieved.
  • To encourage the continued engagement of the Seller or other key executives in the target company’s success following the sale.

The Buyer’s Perspective

Buyers often view an earnout as providing several advantages. An earnout can prevent a Buyer from over-paying for the target company because a portion of the value will be based on the target company’s actual future performance versus anticipated or predicted future performance. In addition, an earnout allocates to the Seller a portion of the risk of the target company’s future performance.

On the other hand, in order to protect the integrity of the business deal between the Buyer and Seller around the earnout, Sellers sometimes negotiate the inclusion of restrictions on the Buyer’s operation of the target company post-closing as part of the earnout provision. These restrictions may include limiting the Buyer from making certain operational changes or limiting the integration of the target company into the Buyer’s pre-transaction business during the earnout period.

The Buyer may also view an earnout provision as a risk if the Seller continues to manage the target company during the earnout period and does so in a manner primarily focused on achieving the earnout in the short term to the detriment of the target company’s long-term performance following the closing of the transaction.

The Seller’s Perspective

Generally, we advise Seller clients to negotiate for receiving all or as much of the purchase price consideration as possible at the closing, and not pursuant to an earnout. However, if the Seller is satisfied with the purchase price received at closing, that Seller may find an earnout attractive because it provides the Seller the opportunity to realize a premium on the purchase price relative to what the Buyer otherwise might have agreed to pay.

With any earnout, the Seller should be confident that the earnout targets can be realistically achieved post-closing.

Some Sellers view earnouts as disadvantageous because they defer and make contingent a portion of the purchase price or may tie Sellers to the target company for a longer time period post-closing than those Sellers may desire. Achievement of the earnout may also be completely or largely in the hands of the Buyer in instances where the Seller is not involved in the target company after the closing or does not have operational control.

Further, if the Buyer has latitude to make material changes to the management, structure, or operations of the target company following the closing, the earnout targets can be at risk.

Key Considerations in Structuring an Earnout

Earnout provisions can vary significantly from transaction to transaction. However, several key issues should be considered with any earnout, including:

  • The financial and/or non-financial targets to be achieved in the earnout. The financial and non-financial targets should be objective, measurable, and clearly defined in the purchase agreement.
    • Examples of financial targets include total revenue, net income, EBITDA or some other financial measurement that is relevant to the target company’s operations.
    • Non-financial targets may be appropriate when financial targets do not provide for a relevant measure of a target company’s performance. For example, with an emerging technology company with limited revenue on which to base a financial target, the parties may instead agree on non-financial targets, such as achievement of certain operational or product development milestones.
  • The length of the earnout period, the timing of the earnout payments, and the formula for determining earnout payments. These terms are largely driven by the financial or non-financial target chosen by the parties as well as, with respect to the earnout period, potential tax considerations for each party.
  • Form of Earnout Payment. The parties will need to agree on whether the earnout payment will be made in cash, which is typical, or in some other form of payment, such as the issuance of equity in the Buyer.
  • Procedures and Dispute Resolution. The parties should always carefully consider the procedures for calculating and verifying any relevant financial target for each earnout payment. In most cases, the parties agree to involve an independent third party, such as a mutually agreed upon accounting firm, to determine the calculations in the event of any objection to the earnout calculation.

Conclusion

Properly structuring an earnout is often a critical component of a successful private company M&A process and outcome. The attorneys at Linden Law Partners have extensive experience drafting and negotiating M&A purchase agreements, including all aspects of earnout provisions, that address the dynamics of each individual transaction. Please contact us here or call us at (303) 731-0007 to discuss how we can help you evaluate or structure an earnout as part of any M&A transaction that you may be considering.

Practical Considerations Involving Drag-Along and Tag-Along Rights

What Are “Drag-Along” and “Tag-Along” Rights?

“Drag-along” and “tag-along” provisions are staples of venture capital and other investment agreements.  They are often included in investors’ rights or shareholders’ agreements for corporations or operating agreements for limited liability companies. 

The “drag-along” provision, sometimes called a “bring along,” gives a majority owner or owners the right to require the minority owners to participate in a sale of a company to a third party along with the majority. This provides the controlling owners, who typically have more at risk, greater certainty that they will be able to negotiate and approve a sale of the company on favorable terms without minority holders preventing or delaying the sale to negotiate special terms.  Standard drag-along provisions provide that the minority owners sell their interests for the same price (or in accordance with the company’s liquidation provisions), and otherwise largely on the same terms and conditions as apply for the controlling owners.

The tag-along right, also known as a co-sale right, is the corollary to the drag-along. It provides that if the majority owners or, in some cases, just the founders, sell their ownership interests directly and not in connection with a sale of the entire company, the minority owners have the right to sell a pro-rata portion of their ownership at the same price and on the same terms and conditions.  The purpose of the co-sale right is to protect against the controlling owners or founders cashing out their interests without the minority owners having the same opportunity. 

In practice, drag-along and tag-along rights are rarely formally triggered. Rather, they serve as important checks and balances to help assure the owners act fairly and in good faith with each other by providing guard rails.

Because the motivations of each owner and the dynamics and relative bargaining power among the owners vary, investors, founders, and other owners should give careful consideration to the drafting of drag-along and tag-along rights.  As with most contract provisions, a little extra preparation upfront can provide the parties with greater certainty in the future when an exit opportunity arises. Below, we highlight just a few of the key elements of drag-along and co-sale provisions.

What Circumstances Can Trigger the Drag-Along Right?

Typically, controlling owners will seek for the drag-along right to be triggered in the event of any transaction resulting in a change in control of the business involving an unaffiliated third party acquirer.  Although less common, minority owners may seek to limit the types of transactions that would trigger the drag-along right, require a certain period of time to have passed before the drag-along can be triggered, or require certain valuation thresholds or other company performance benchmarks be met before a drag-along can be triggered. 

The drag-along right typically can be triggered if the board and the holders of at least a majority of ownership interests approve the drag-along sale.  Depending on the circumstances and negotiating leverage, a percentage ownership greater than a majority may make sense. For example, if two 35% owners are the largest holders, they may agree that they both need to be in favor of the sale to trigger the drag-along, suggesting owners holding at least 70% of the company must approve the sale in order to trigger the drag-along.

When Can Tag-Along Rights be Triggered?

The mechanism for triggering tag-along rights may, like drag-along rights, may vary based on the motivations of the parties.  However, tag-along rights commonly can be triggered when the controlling owner(s) or founders key to operating the business have a deal to transfer its or their interests to an unaffiliated third party.  Transfers to affiliates and for estate-planning purposes are often carved out.

Who Should Be Able to Participate in a Tag-Along Sale?

Typically, all other owners will have the right to participate in the tag-along sale.

What Type and Amount of Tag-Along Interests may be Sold by Minority Owners?

Tag-along rights apply on a proportionate ownership basis, resulting in the initiating sellers having the amount they planned to sell reduced to accommodate the sale of ownership interests held by the other owners.  In situations where there is more than one class of ownership interest, the parties should ensure the formula for determining the amount and class of interests that can be sold by the minority owners in the tag-along sale is appropriate and actually works, such as on an “as converted” basis. Running through real number scenarios can be very helpful in this regard.

Careful consideration in the negotiation and drafting of drag-along and tag-along provisions are important to help ensure that investors, founders, and minority owners in privately-held companies protect their differing interests in anticipation of a future sale of the company. 

The attorneys at Linden Lw Partners have extensive specialized experience with drafting and negotiating a broad range of shareholder, limited liability company, and investor agreements in connection with private investments and anticipating the different merger and acquisition scenarios. Please contact us here or call us at (303) 731-0007 to discuss how we can help your company.